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Chapter 9
Main Findings and Recommendations
Gorana Krstic´, Friedrich Schneider, Mihail Arandarenko, Milojko Arsic´,
Branko Radulovic´, Sasˇa Ranđelovic´, and Irena Jankovic´
9.1 Main Findings
In this section we will summarise the findings presented in the previous chapters on
the key causes of the shadow economy in Serbia and the mechanisms that contrib-
ute to its development. We will also present the results of an estimate of the extent
of the shadow economy in relation to GDP, estimates of various forms of the
shadow economy in the sectors of businesses and entrepreneurs and their charac-
teristics, and an estimate of the effects that formalising the shadow economy can
have on the government budget and economic growth. Finally, we will summarise
findings that relate to the administrative and institutional capacity of government
institutions tasked with overseeing the operation of business entities.
9.1.1 Causes of the Shadow Economy
Some of the fiscal causes of the shadow economy are the relatively high fiscal
burden on labour, complex and expensive tax procedures, a complex and opaque
tax system, the lack of organisation, training, and equipment at the Tax
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Administration, the low quality of public-sector services, and high tolerance of the
shadow economy.
We have singled out the following features of the labour market that have a
bearing on the growth of the shadow economy: taxation of labour; minimum wage;
social benefits system; employment protection legislation; minimum wage regula-
tion; unemployment benefits; and retirement rules. The most significant of these are
the rules for taxing labour, primarily the high tax burden on lower-paid work caused
by the low tax-exempt allowance, high contribution rates, and minimum contribu-
tion base. Since the natural zone for formalising the informal economy is around the
amount of the minimum wage, a high burden on minimum wages implies high costs
of formalisation, and thereby discourages it. This effect is compounded by the high
minimum wage, which currently stands at around 50 % of the average wage,
exceeding the recommended level by some 10 percentage points. The minimum
contribution base makes part-time employment contracts unpopular, and also
effectively prevents the introduction of special contractual arrangements at more
favourable tax rates such as the ‘mini jobs’ and ‘midi jobs’ that have successfully
contributed to the flexibility of the labour market in some European countries.
Apart from causes in the tax system and features of the labour market, other
factors of particular importance in Serbia have to do with the unfavourable eco-
nomic and regulatory environment. Of the economic conditions we can single out
low productivity and widespread liquidity issues, especially pronounced in times of
crisis. While low productivity forces business entities to shift at least part of their
operations into the informal sector to be viable in the market, the lack of liquidity
affects the taxpayer’s decision to evade taxes and so preserve funds needed to pay
suppliers. Regulatory constraints particularly include high administrative costs and
legal insecurity. In addition there are many other factors that are the consequences
of weak institutions and a chaotic system, such as issues with construction permits,
inefficient market exit, and frequent abuses using ‘phoenix companies’. The poor
institutional framework is also reflected in a high degree of tolerance for the shadow
economy on the part of the state and the high level of corruption. These two factors,
coupled with the low quality of public services, further disincentivise taxpayers
from paying their taxes.
Some of the major factors favourable to the shadow economy that are found in
the financial sector are the major share of cash transactions in the total volume of
payments, informal financing, and unregistered remittances sent by migrants resid-
ing abroad. Cash payments continue to account for a major portion of total
payments in Serbia, although they have seen a downward trend of late. These
circumstances have been further complicated by the fact that the high level of
euroisation has stimulated moral hazard behaviour by transactors, while transac-
tions have been made primarily in foreign currency and outside legal channels.
Moreover, the volume of informal finance has grown with the shadow economy.
The causes behind the use of informal sources of finance are poor local regulations
and contract enforcement mechanisms, barriers to market entry, expensive formal
finance, lack of financial products appropriate to consumer needs, inadequate tax
regulations, and high tax burdens. Informal financing causes greater information
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asymmetries between market participants, lack of tax revenues from these activi-
ties, and exclusion of formal financial intermediaries from the transfer of funds.
This adversely impacts the development of the financial sector and the efficient
allocation of finance. Finally, remittances from migrants abroad are a particularly
significant source of foreign capital in Serbia, as their post-crisis amounts in
absolute terms exceed all other categories of capital inflows from private and public
sources. The vast majority of remittances enter the country through informal
channels and are often not invested in productive activity; this has negative effects
on economic growth and development.
9.1.2 Estimates of the Extent of the Shadow Economy
and Tax Gap
The extent of the shadow economy in Serbia was estimated using three methods:
MIMIC, Household Tax Compliance (HTC), and the Survey on Conditions for
Doing Business in Serbia. The application of the MIMIC method found that across
all sectors in Serbia the shadow economy stood at some 30 % of official GDP in
2010. Data for the same year resulted in an estimate of 23.6 % of GDP for the
shadow economy, identified on the basis of household income and consumption
(the HTC method). According to the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in
Serbia, the shadow economy in the business sector stood at some 21 % of GDP for
the two major types of informal activity (illicit trade and undeclared work). Based
on these results we can conclude that the total extent of the shadow economy in
Serbia was 30 % of GDP, and that this was for the most part accounted for by trade
in goods and undeclared work.
The study also estimated the tax gap in the collection of VAT, personal income
tax, and social security contributions. The VAT gap was estimated at 2.5 % of GDP,
while the gap in personal income tax and social security contributions was put at
about 5 % of GDP. We believe that the estimates of tax gaps for the key forms of
taxation are relatively reliable. By extrapolating these estimates we arrived at an
approximate estimate of the total tax gap in Serbia, which we put at about 10 % of
GDP. A similar figure was also obtained using the HTC method, which indirectly
supports the above estimate.
9.1.3 The Shadow Economy in the Business
and Entrepreneur Sector
We analysed the shadow economy in the business and entrepreneur sector by using
data from the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia based on three
indicators. These were: (1) the share of business entities engaged in the shadow
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economy in the total number of business entities; (2) the share of informal workers
in the total number of workers, both overall and by type; and (3) the share of cash
payments in the total volume of payments.
The Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia asked respondents
whether their own business was engaged in the shadow economy, and found that
28 % of all business entities in Serbia did so. These businesses and entrepreneurs
employed workers informally and/or made payments in cash even though they were
VAT payers. The term ‘informal worker’ is used to describe workers employed
without a contract, or those who do have contracts but only part of whose wage is
officially declared, with the remainder paid in cash. The findings showed that there
was a link between the shadow economy and the type and age of the business entity:
entrepreneurs and new start-ups were more likely to engage in the shadow econ-
omy, while the common relationship between the shadow economy and the size of
business entities, whereby smaller businesses are more likely to work in the shadow
economy, could not be confirmed. Most business entities operating informally were
in construction (42.9 %), as is also evidenced by most empirical research; this
sector was followed by agriculture (33.8 %), catering (33.1 %) and transportation
(32.7 %). According to region, business entities located in Central Serbia (exclud-
ing Belgrade) were the most prone to operate in the shadow economy, while those
in Belgrade were least likely to do so (33 % versus 24.7 %).
A further two indicators of the shadow economy were based on respondents’
views on the participation of their own businesses compared to their opinions on
how active other businesses from the same sector were. All types of shadow
economy were represented to a much greater extent in ‘other’ businesses in the
same sector than in the respondents’ own businesses. We therefore considered data
obtained from owners/managers’ biased responses regarding their own business
activity in the shadow economy as the lower limit of the shadow economy, while
figures obtained on the basis of their subjective views on the participation of other
businesses from the same sector were deemed to denote the upper limit. Hence, the
share of employees working without formal contracts ranged from 1.9 % (lower
limit) to 23.9 % (upper limit) of the total number of employees; the share of workers
whose total wages were not declared varied between 3.8 and 24.7 %; while the
share of turnover in cash ranged between 11.3 and 21.6 % of the total volume of
turnover.
The results of econometric analysis based on the survey data show that several
variables are statistically significant and represent important determinants for
making decisions on whether or not to join the shadow economy. They confirm
the findings of similar studies that entrepreneurs are more likely to operate infor-
mally. In addition, we found that size (as measured by the number of employees)
and the VAT status of entity are significant. Doing business in particular sectors of
economic activity, (construction) is statistically significant, while according to
some specifications the transportation sector increases and the trade sector
decreases the probability of participation in the shadow economy. Regional vari-
ables are not statistically significant. Finally, the business attitude towards justifi-
cation of the shadow economy is also statistically significant, which leads to the
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conclusion that measures aimed at changing opinions about the shadow economy
should play a more pronounced role.
There is widespread competition from business entities operating in the informal
sector. On average, entities claimed they lost nearly 28 % of their income from this
competition, while almost 35 % stated that the shadow economy was a large or very
large obstacle to doing business. This is particularly evident in the sectors of
transportation and construction, where nearly all respondents said they were
exposed to some type of competition from the shadow economy. Our analysis
also found that competition from the informal sector was felt less by companies
with foreign equity, as well as when informal activities are more likely to be
detected. We found significant correlation between the various types of informal
activity, so that making and receiving cash payments was often accompanied by
employing undeclared workers and paying wages in cash.
9.1.4 Estimated Impact of Formalising the Shadow Economy
Based on our assessment of the tax gap, we estimate that a decrease in the extent of
the shadow economy could, over a period of up to 3 years, result in additional
revenues of between 0.8 and 1.1 % of GDP, while over a decade additional revenues
of close to 2 % of GDP could be expected. When viewed in a broader fiscal context,
additional revenues resulting from less informal activity will not make it possible to
reduce tax rates, nor will they allow discretionary increases in public spending. The
shadow economy must be addressed to compensate for the drop in revenues
collected from consumption taxes that will occur due to the necessary reduction
in the absorption gap. The current absorption gap, characterised by a balance of
payments deficit of some 10 % of GDP, is unsustainable in the long run since it
leads to continual growth of foreign debt and net foreign assets. A reduction of the
absorption gap by some 5 percentage points of GDP is estimated to have an
autonomous impact on the decline in VAT revenues of about 1 % of GDP.
Moreover, autonomous growth of public expenditure can be expected in the long
run as the population ages; it would thus be more favourable to ensure that
additional expenditures can be met through better collection of existing taxes,
rather than by increasing tax rates. If addressing the shadow economy generates
additional revenue it should be used to reduce the fiscal deficit rather than to reduce
tax rates or increase taxes in a discretionary manner.
Even though there has been a lot of empirical research on the effects of
formalising the informal economy on economic growth, there are still no clear
and unambiguous empirical or theoretical findings that indicate whether the shadow
economy has a positive or a negative impact or what the direction of causality is
(Schneider and Enste 2000). According to the findings of the survey carried out in
Serbia and ten other Central and Eastern European countries for the period 2001–
2010 using the MIMIC method, the effect of the shadow economy on official GDP
is statistically highly significant and has the expected negative sign. The GDP per
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capita coefficient indicates that if GDP per capita declines by 1 percentage point,
the shadow economy will grow by between 0.6 and 0.7 percentage points,
depending on the model used. In other words, if GDP declines in the future the
shadow economy will increase as business entities seek to compensate for fewer
opportunities in the formal sector. This result is evidence of the importance of
maintaining macroeconomic stability and creating conditions for future economic
growth, as these are major components of successful strategies designed to formal-
ise the informal economy.
9.1.5 The Administrative Capacity of Institutions Tasked
with Overseeing Business: Labour Inspectorate,
Market Inspectorate, and Tax Administration
The Labour Inspectorate is charged with tackling informal employment, or ‘work-
ing in the shadow’. When workers without employment contracts are discovered at
a business the employer is given a deadline for either signing contracts with those
employees or letting them go. The employer has a brief window to notify the
Inspectorate of the steps taken. Although this procedure is clearly aimed at
protecting workers without contracts, its preventive role can be disputed since
there is no credible threat of sanctions to prevent future non-compliance. Even
though the law provides for substantial fines for these offences they can only be
handed down by the courts, and the procedure for proving breaches of the law is
very demanding. The Inspectorate is even more constrained in its oversight of
completely unregistered businesses or ‘phantom firms’, since access to their pre-
mises needs police assistance. Respondents’ estimates of the extent of informal
employment made in the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia are
relatively high, especially in the sectors of construction, catering, trade, and indus-
try. Similarly, estimates of the extent of the practice of paying a portion of wages
while evading taxes and contributions for formally declared workers were also
high. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that respondents had mixed views regarding
the efficiency of the Labour Inspectorate. Nonetheless, this service was ranked
slightly higher than both the Tax Administration and the Market Inspectorate,
which corresponds to the finding that the principal issue does not lie with the
capacities of the staff and the organisation of the Labour Inspectorate: rather it is
prevented from being more effective in tackling informal employment and
undeclared earnings by lack of resources and an inadequate statutory framework.
The primary task of the Market Inspectorate is to ensure the implementation of
the Law on Trade and, in doing so, prevent various forms of illicit trade. Goods are
most often sold in the informal sector through personal advertisements, in markets,
in undeclared stores or self-employed craftsmen’s shops, from improvised roadside
stalls, and at illegal distribution centres. When the Market Inspectorate establishes
that an infringement has taken place it cannot impose a fine but must bring
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proceedings in court. Market inspectors may issue rulings that require the infringe-
ment to be remedied, temporarily ban trading in particular goods or provision of
particular services and temporarily close down a retail or wholesale outlet, or call
for goods to be confiscated. The Market Inspectorate’s remit is very broad and is
governed by myriad laws and bylaws, which clearly impedes its efficiency and
often leads to overlapping with other sectoral inspection services, including the
Municipal Inspectorate. As regards its organisation, the Inspectorate is very
fragmented, both horizontally and vertically, which hinders its effectiveness.
Even though respondents in the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia
generally viewed it in a positive light, the Market Inspectorate scored slightly lower
than both the Labour Inspectorate and the Tax Administration.
The Tax Administration was also less than efficient when uncovering tax
evasion, which is the consequence of its lack of human and financial resources,
inadequate staff structure, and systemic exchange of data with other government
bodies aimed at discovering tax evasion. According to 2011 data the Republic of
Serbia Tax Administration employed 6,165 staff, which is less than optimal given
the number of taxpayers and international standards. Of the total number only 55 %
have university degrees and the average age of employees is 49. In addition, many
staff are tasked with receiving and technically processing tax filings, while the
number of people carrying out tax audits is inadequate. The total budget of the Tax
Administration is lower than necessary, and as a result salaries are low, which
incentivises younger staff to leave after gaining experience in tax audit, which in
turn has an adverse impact on audit quality and overall Tax Administration effi-
ciency. The fact that business processes are not automated, that there is no cross-
checking system to access and compare data from other government bodies (e.g.,
Real Estate Cadastre, Pension and Disability Insurance Fund, local Public Revenue
Administrations, the police, etc.), that the mechanisms used to select taxpayers for
audit are sub-optimal, and that the staff structure is inadequate, all result in a low
likelihood of uncovering tax evasion, which serves as an incentive to operate in the
informal sector.
9.2 Recommendations for Formalising the Shadow
Economy
9.2.1 Strategy for Formalising the Shadow Economy
A successful policy to formalise the shadow economy must reduce the entry of new
participants and foster the formalisation of existing participants by moving their
activities from the shadow to the formal economy. This requires a strategy that
addresses the root causes and mechanisms that contribute to its development:
excessive tax burden, over-regulation of economic activity, and weak and ineffec-
tive government bodies. The causes of the shadow economy are many and varied
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and multiple methods are needed to reintegrate it with formal channels. Policies
designed to reduce the shadow economy can be divided into general reforms that
address the shadow economy by building a favourable environment for doing
business in the formal sector, incentives directly aimed at the shadow economy,
and building the administrative capacity of the state.
Business entities decide how to operate on the basis of their assessment of the
costs and benefits associated with doing business in either the formal or the shadow
economy. Therefore any policy aimed at formalising the shadow economy should
change the cost-benefit ratio for both the shadow and the formal economies.
There have been frequent attempts to change this cost-benefit ratio in the shadow
economy by increasing administrative repression (i.e., through better detection and
greater penalties). The policy for reducing the extent of the shadow economy
pursued by most European countries up until 2000 was founded on exactly these
repressive measures (Williams et al. 2008). However, the experiences of these
countries, as well as of Serbia and Yugoslavia since the 1990s, show that this is
neither the only nor the best avenue of approach, since relying solely on repressive
methods without tackling the underlying causes of the shadow economy decreases
economic activity by reducing the shadow economy without a corresponding
increase in the formal economy (Krstic´ et al. 1998; Williams 2005). The use of
repressive measures does, however, yield good results when the aim is to prevent
entities joining the informal economy or to close down businesses already operating
in the shadow economy, rather than to move business entities from the shadow to
the formal economy.
Another means of changing the cost-benefit ratio in the shadow economy is to
use various measures to reduce the benefits enjoyed by entities operating in it. This
can be accomplished primarily by cutting costs (reducing the burden of taxes and
business regulations) and increasing the benefits in the formal economy (e.g. by
providing access to incentives and loans) in order to make operating in this sector
more attractive. This can be achieved through preventive measures and incentives.
Preventive measures can prevent the emergence of the shadow economy by reduc-
ing the tax burden and allowing new types of formal work. Preventive measures are
directly aimed at participants in the shadow economy and are intended to induce
them to formalise their operation. They include amnesties at the individual or
general level for those wishing to join the formal sector, business advisory and
support services, and targeted direct and indirect tax breaks for employing declared
workers.
The practical task and key challenge for economic policy in Serbia is to develop
a well-balanced combination of incentives and sanctions that will maximise the
formalisation of participants in the shadow economy—businesses, entrepreneurs,
and workers—and result in the loss of as little GDP or overall employment as
possible. Ideally, the admixture of these incentives and penalties should comprise
incentives aimed at incorporating those population groups that are excluded from
the formal economy and re-integrating businesses and entrepreneurs that have left
the formal economy due to high taxes, rigid regulations, or the economic crisis; and
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sanctions designed to discourage voluntary, opportunistic use of the shadow econ-
omy to generate excessive profits through illegal cost-cutting.
The key prerequisite for a successful strategy to formalise the shadow economy
is to complete transition and stabilise the legal and institutional structures of
society, and then achieve and maintain macroeconomic stability and create pre-
conditions for economic growth. The impact of these factors on the shadow
economy is just one of their many desirable effects. The econometric findings
presented in Chap. 6 indicate that an increase in registered GDP leads to a drop
in the extent of the shadow economy. In other words, if GDP were to decline in the
future the shadow economy would increase, since business entities would endeav-
our to compensate for fewer business opportunities in the formal sector by working
in the shadow economy. In these circumstances the measures proposed will not be
fully effective.
The econometric analysis shows that there are no statistically significant differ-
ences in the involvement of individual sectors in the shadow economy, except for in
construction and trade. Thus the proposed measures for formalising the shadow
economy are mainly sector-neutral; i.e., address all sectors equally. An exception to
this is measures aimed at the construction sector and some services.
We propose a set of preventive measures and incentives aimed at formalising the
shadow economy that cover tax policy and regulation, labour market institutions,
and the financial sector. The recommendations that entail building the administra-
tive capacity of government bodies relate primarily to the institutions that oversee
businesses with informal employees and/or that make and receive cash payments:
the Tax Authority, the Labour Inspectorate, and the Market Inspectorate. These
recommendations are based on the analysis of the operation of these institutions
presented in the preceding chapter. Table 9.1 at the end of this chapter shows the
key recommendations for formalising the shadow economy for each of these areas,
their sectoral coverage, the institutions responsible for conducting such measures,
and the expected outcomes of their implementation.
9.2.2 Fiscal Policy Measures
Fiscal policy includes tax policy, public expenditures policy, and public debt
management. The main factors affecting the formalization of the shadow economy
are the characteristics of the tax and public expenditures system, while public debt
policy does not have a substantial bearing on the informal sector.
The key measures that can be applied to combat the shadow economy within the
framework of tax policy are:
• Reducing distortions introduced by taxes;
• Reducing tax compliance costs;
• Reducing the return to tax evasion, and
• Reducing tolerance of the shadow economy.
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Table 9.1 Recommendations for formalising the shadow economy
Fiscal policy
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome
Reduce fiscal burden
on labour (see section
on features of the
labour market)






increase in rate of
registered
employment
Remove tax breaks for
corporate income tax
and harmonise taxation
of property of both
individuals and legal
entities
All sectors Ministry of Finance
and Economy
Less distortion gener-






All sectors Ministry of Finance
and Economy/Tax
Administration
Lower cost of admin-
istering taxes and
greater readiness of
taxpayers to pay taxes






selecting entities to be
audited
All sectors Ministry of Finance
and Economy/Tax
Administration





utory penalties for tax
evasion
All sectors Ministry of Finance
and Economy/Tax
Administration/courts
Greater cost of tax
evasion and, conse-
quently, less evasion
Ban sale of new indus-
trial products in flea
markets, farmers’ mar-
kets, and roadside stalls
All sectors Municipal Police Reduction in volume
of shadow economy
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Fiscal policy
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome
Improve co-ordination
between Tax Adminis-








ticularly in exchange of
information


















by state to abandoning
practice of writing off
interest on back taxes
All sectors Ministry of Finance
and Economy
Greater readiness of




and value of services
provided by the gov-
ernment and the draw-
backs of the shadow
economy through the
public education sys-
tem and the media






Invest effort in system-
atically improving the




Public services Government of Serbia/
all Ministries
Greater readiness of
taxpayers to pay taxes
Features of the labour market
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome




to level of minimum
wage








base for social insur-
ance contributions
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Fiscal policy
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome
Introduce more
favourable tax treat-
ment for ‘mini’ and
‘midi’ jobs























tion rates by sector or
progressive social
security contributions




level of 50 % of aver-
age wage to around or
under 40 %







hourly rates for over-
time work







ments to years of ser-
vice with last employer
rather than total years
of service








contracts to 3 years










expected use of retire-
ment payments
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Fiscal policy
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome
Introduce micro-
lending facilities






































































Reduce extent of infor-
mal finance
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Fiscal policy
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome
Business environment





bans imposed on busi-
ness owners and man-
agers in criminal or
other proceedings)
































to take part in the con-
sultation process
All sectors Government of Serbia Private sector partici-
pates in consultation





Adopt bylaws in a
timely fashion




All sectors Ministry of Foreign













Multiple sectors Multiple regulatory
bodies
Lower start-up costs









Construction Ministry of Construc-
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Reducing Distortions Introduced by Taxes
The extent of distortions introduced by taxes stands in proportion to the square of
the tax rate, meaning that higher tax rates also introduce higher distortions. Tax
rates in Serbia are generally relatively low, and so the distortions are not substantial.
An exception to this rule is the total fiscal burden on labour, which stands at some
39 % in Serbia, slightly lower than in developed EU member states but greater than
in countries at similar levels of development (Arsic´ et al. 2010). Therefore total
taxes on labour in Serbia are high and create incentives for tax evasion. The high tax
burden is a particular constraint on labour-intensive sectors of activity such as the
textile industry and services. A major reduction in the fiscal burden on labour would
have a positive impact on the readiness of taxpayers to actually pay their taxes.
Detailed recommendations on the taxation of labour are presented in the following
section, which deals with measures aimed at the labour market.
In addition to the high fiscal burden on labour, the highest marginal rate1 of the
regular annual property tax, standing at 2 %, is considered to be relatively high and
serves to foster various forms of tax evasion. Any reform of property tax, assuming
this type of taxation remains progressive, should therefore limit the top marginal tax
rate to 1 %. This change would not have much significance for the budget, but
would be justified from the point of view of both reducing the shadow economy and
enhancing efficiency and equity.
Distortions introduced by taxes also depend on the number of tax rates, breaks,
and exemptions for each type of tax, special tax regimes, etc. The more rates there
are for each personal income tax, the greater the opportunities for tax evasion. In
general, the Serbian tax system is well designed in this respect and does not offer
much incentive for tax evasion. It would, however, be desirable for future reforms
of the VAT framework to gradually introduce a single tax rate, as this would reduce
the scope for tax evasion. The most tax breaks and exemptions apply to corporate
Table 9.1 (continued)
Fiscal policy
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome
‘Legalise’ buildings
without permits







Outreach All sectors Government of Serbia Less tax evasion; or
more incentive to shift
from shadow to for-
mal economy
1 The marginal tax rate is calculated by dividing the increase in tax by the increase in the tax base.
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income tax. Although these breaks for the most part do not contribute to the shadow
economy, they nonetheless facilitate tax avoidance and tax fraud, and as such
should be gradually abolished.
Reduce Tax Compliance Costs
Greater costs associated with administering taxes encourage taxpayers to evade
them. The tax compliance costs grow larger as the number of taxes in the system
increase, become more complicated, as the number of payments per year increases,
and as e-filing opportunities become more limited. The tax compliance costs are
particularly relevant for small taxpayers (e.g., small and micro-businesses, entre-
preneurs) whose incomes are low. One of the main measures to reduce tax com-
pliance costs is continual re-examination of the justification for numerous fiscal and
quasi-fiscal charges. Complicated and unclear tax regulations increase tax compli-
ance costs and facilitate accidental or deliberate tax evasion. However, the assess-
ment of some taxes—such as the corporate income tax—is not aligned with
international accounting standards, which increases compliance costs, particularly
for foreign companies doing business in Serbia. Although the divergence of
accounting standards from international practice is probably not a major cause of
the shadow economy, bringing them into line with global standards is important in
improving general conditions for doing business in Serbia.
Simplifying tax procedures to cut the number of tax payments each year would
increase e-payment options, reduce tax compliance costs, and increase the readiness
of taxpayers to pay their taxes voluntarily.
Reforming the system of quasi-fiscal charges is an important precondition for
improving the business environment and reducing the costs of doing business. The
reform process begun in 2012 with the removal of 138 individual dues is an
important step towards improving the business environment; it has resulted in the
abolishment of many unjustified charges and the definition of statutory procedures
for the introduction of new dues; moreover, all charges are now paid into the
national budget. Besides removing the remaining unjustified charges, future efforts
should focus on combining similar fees and appropriately naming and categorising
them. It is particularly important to improve the parameters used in defining the
charges that are justified: these include adjusting the tax burden to the financial
strength of each taxpayer, aligning fees with the expenses associated with the
provision of a service by the government, and bringing the amounts of charges
into line with the benefits enjoyed or damage caused by the payer. Systemic
limitations need to be introduced to avoid a return to an economically distorting
and unfair system of quasi-fiscal charges. With this in mind, it is important to again
apply the gross budget principle consistently, as well as to introduce any fiscal and
quasi-fiscal dues exclusively by law.
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Reduce the Return to Tax Evasion
Tax evasion can be viewed as a rational choice on the part of taxpayers that depends
on the cost-benefit ratio of evading taxes. Hence, to reduce tax evasion its benefits
must be reduced and its costs increased. An increase in the costs of tax evasion can
be brought about by increasing the probability of detection, as well as by increasing
penalties in the case of evasion. Empirical research shows that increasing the
probability of detection is a greater deterrent to evasion than imposing harsher
penalties. Reforming the Tax Administration is the one decisive precondition for
increasing the probability of detecting tax evasion: this means carrying out more
frequent audits, while the probability of a taxpayer being audited should be based
on the risk of that taxpayer actually committing tax evasion.
In addition, the probability of prosecuting tax evasion needs to be increased. For
this to happen, systematic measures must be taken to tackle corruption at the Tax
Administration, as well as to improve co-operation between the Tax Administration
and other government bodies. Efficient prosecution of tax evasion cases also
depends on changes to criminal legislation, training of judiciary bodies, and
combating corruption within the judiciary.
Increase Tax Morals
The readiness of taxpayers to engage in evasion does not depend only on the cost-
benefit ration, but also on their moral views of tax evasion. Moral views of how
justified tax evasion is depend on numerous factors, such as tradition, how other
taxpayers behave, the existence of privileged taxpayers, government tolerance of
tax evasion, the quality of public services, etc. There are many ways in which
governments can encourage taxpayers to regard evasion as immoral, such as
incorporating anti-evasion messages into the education system and media cam-
paigns. The readiness of individuals to pay taxes depends on the behaviour of other
individuals and their estimated readiness to pay their taxes. If the government is
consistent and unselective in tackling tax evasion, taxpayers will be more certain
that others will pay and will be more willing to pay themselves.
Reduce Tolerance for the Shadow Economy
Tax evasion is more or less tolerated in most democratic societies, and the shadow
economy is often treated as an activity that contributes to the social security of the
less well-off. However, the high tolerance of the shadow economy in Serbia does
not extend only to vulnerable groups. Reducing tolerance for the shadow economy
in Serbia is necessary to reduce the extent of informal operations. This primarily
entails consistently and unselectively banning activities that result in visible and
noticeable tax evasion. Specifically, in the case of Serbia, this would entail:
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• Introducing a ban on the sale of new industrial products in flea markets, farmers’
markets, and roadside stalls.
• The fact that there are many untaxed buildings sends a clear message that the
government tolerates the shadow economy.2 A major increase in the reach of
taxation of real property would clearly indicate that the government is becoming
less tolerant of the shadow economy. To this end, national authorities could
provide technical support to local bodies and introduce a system of incentives
and penalties for local authorities dependant on their degree of success in
increasing the reach of taxation and property tax collection.
• Many forms of shadow activity are openly engaged in via the Internet, classified
ads in newspapers, etc. These could be prevented relatively easily, but this is not
done due to the passive stance of the Tax Administration, which does not
monitor new channels of tax evasion. Particularly significant in this respect is
the widespread practice of catering establishments (restaurants, coffee bars, etc.)
not issuing fiscal receipts or not assessing and paying VAT, although added
value is high in this sector. This type of tax evasion can be uncovered without a
great deal of additional training for tax inspectors, since evasion is obvious and
easy to discover. Therefore, since the introduction of e-filing will release many
Tax Administration staff from their current technical and administrative duties
(receiving and certifying tax filings, entering data into the database, etc.), it is
recommended that they be reassigned to audits of sectors where tax evasion is
obviously taking place.
• Over the past several decades there have been clear discrepancies between the
amount of property owned by many Serbian nationals and income reported to the
Tax Administration. The absence of any reaction from the Tax Administration is
a form of tolerance for tax evasion—and for tax evasion that has nothing to do
with social security. Regulations on cross-checking property and income must
be implemented without delay, and those individuals whose assets far exceed
their declared income must be subject to ex-post income tax. The government’s
decision to finally implement statutory provisions allowing the cross-checking
of property and reported income is a major step forward in tackling the shadow
economy. That said, it is crucial to ensure that the Tax Administration continues
to cross-check property and income rather than for this effort to be a one-off
exercise. For these measures to succeed fully, the Tax Administration needs
to co-operate with other government bodies in order to increase its capacity
for uncovering the real owners of property in Serbia. Establishing sound
co-operation with foreign tax authorities is also necessary to identify and
appraise the assets that Serbian nationals hold abroad.
2According to Tax Administration estimates, some 15 % of flats in residential buildings, as well as
office buildings, are untaxed; for individual houses, the figure stands at over 20 % (Arsic´ and
Ranđelovic´ 2012).
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Encourage Taxpayers to Settle Reported Tax Liabilities Fully
and on Time
The practice of companies making tax filings and then failing to pay is widespread
in Serbia. The reason for this is in the poor liquidity of companies, which is often
actually insolvency in disguise. The Tax Administration often tolerates this behav-
iour to avoid forcing taxpayers into formal insolvency, which generally ends in
many workers losing their jobs. This indicates that non-payment of taxes in Serbia,
even when not formally the result of the shadow economy, is a significant type of
financial indiscipline that results in both lower fiscal revenues and less equality for
business entities. Statutory limitations on payment deadlines in commercial trans-
actions are a major step forward in establishing financial discipline. An advantage
of the proposed measure is that the deadlines are the shortest in cases where the
government owes money. Yet the reach of this measure is relatively constrained by
the fact that financial indiscipline is primarily caused by the presence of insolvent
businesses in the market. The decisive factor in establishing financial discipline,
therefore, would be the efficient and non-selective implementation of bankruptcy
procedures, which would remove insolvent entities from the market. In that context,
the suspension of automatic insolvency by the Constitutional Court is a step
backward. To establish financial discipline it is also important to raise prices
charged by infrastructure operators so that they cover costs.
Abandon the Practice of Writing off Interest for Late Payment
of Taxes
In addition to being the consequence of tolerating a large number of insolvent
companies active in the market, fiscal indiscipline is also partly caused by the
periodical reductions in and write-offs of back taxes. Over the past two decades
Serbia has, from time to time (generally just before or after a general elections),
written off interest on corporate back taxes. Given the high inflation rate in Serbia,
when interest is written off, so is part of the principal that has decreased in value due
to inflation. When inflation is taken into account, a zero interest rate on tax
liabilities actually becomes a negative interest rate. So, for instance, if interest on
3-year-old back taxes is written off, assuming inflation stands at 10 % per year, the
principal of the tax debt will lose 27 % of its value. By writing off interest on back
taxes the government systematically rewards non-conscientious taxpayers and
directly encourages moral hazard. This means that some taxpayers who are emi-
nently able to pay their taxes choose to wait for interest to be written off and their
tax debt reduced. Writing off interest on tax debts hurts the level playing field for all
participants in the market and fosters negative selection, whereby undisciplined
taxpayers are rewarded and disciplined ones are not.
The adoption of a new Law on the Write-Off of Interest for Late Payment of
Taxes will temporarily improve liquidity in the economy, as well as the inflow of
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funds to the budget. However, the long-term effects of this law on financial
discipline will be markedly negative, since it represents the continuation of the
practice of periodically rewarding undisciplined taxpayers by writing off a portion
of the real value of their principal debt along with nominal interest. Thus the
practice of writing off interest on back taxes should be discontinued, since it
rewards non-compliance and enables insolvent companies to remain in the market.
Improve the Quality of Services Provided by the Government
Taxes are the price that the public pays for services provided by the government.
Thus the readiness of the public to pay taxes depends on the actual volume and
quality of public services, and on individual perceptions of the provided services.
Low quality of public services, unproductive expenditure, and corruption affect the
readiness of the public to pay their taxes. Improving the efficiency of the govern-
ment by enhancing the quality and availability of its services (from security and
justice to education and healthcare) is important for tackling the shadow economy.
Educate the Public About the Importance and Value of Services
Provided by the Government
In addition to improving the quality of government services it is necessary for the
government to work on the perception of the public regarding the value of those
services. The public often underestimate the value of the services provided by the
government: a year of elementary school, certain forms of healthcare, social
security, agricultural subsidies, etc. This bias creates a widespread conviction
among the public that the taxes they pay are much greater than the value of the
services provided by the government. This belief, which is partly true, increases the
willingness of people to not pay their taxes. It would be beneficial, therefore, for
brochures to be periodically mailed to all households (modelled after the ‘citizen’s
budget’ prepared in many developed EU member states) explaining in clear and
easily understandable language how much the government spends for what purpose
and why it is important for individuals and businesses to pay their taxes regularly.
9.2.3 Measures Relating to Features of the Labour Market
Taxation of Labour
The most important recommendation in the field of labour taxation pertains to the
need to substantially reduce labour costs for lower-paying jobs. Any kind of reform
of labour taxation (or, in a broader sense, of the taxation of income derived from
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work) should ideally entail an increase in the tax-exempt personal allowance to the
level of the minimum wage. Most European countries employ this practice.
Tax allowances for family dependents in Serbia are available only to annual
income tax payers, i.e., the richest 1 % of the population. Introducing a tax-exempt
allowance for dependents would reduce the tax burden of employees with an
unemployed spouse and children, and thereby reduce their incentives for joining
the shadow economy.
Another means of reducing the tax burden on lower wages would be the removal
of the minimum social security base, which now stands at 35 % of the average
wage. While its impact on people working full-time jobs is negligible since the
minimum wage is far above this level, it increases labour costs for part-time
workers with standard open-ended employment contracts.
In addition to removing the minimum base for social insurance, an important
incentive to formalising informal employees working part-time jobs would be the
introduction of less restrictive tax treatment of so-called ‘mini jobs’ and ‘midi jobs’,
based on the positive experiences of Germany (Eurofound 2008) where healthcare
and social security contributions for mini jobs (defined by the wages earned rather
than by hours worked) are much lower than standard, while the rate of income tax
can even equal zero. Midi jobs (where wages lie between those of mini jobs and
standard employment) attract contributions that are greater than those for mini jobs
but are still lower than standard. These rules ensure that workers in mini jobs avoid
the trap of wage poverty and ease their transition into standard employment.
Seasonal workers in agriculture, tourism, and other seasonal activities may find
the Montenegrin solution beneficial: employers there are required to pay a fixed
amount per day for each seasonal employee.
Some countries have also introduced progressive contributions for social secu-
rity or contribution rates that differ by sector, with labour-intensive, lower-paying
sectors of activity (where the shadow economy is generally more widespread)
paying contributions at lower-than-standard rates. Empirical, theoretical, and leg-
islative arguments for and against the introduction of such differentiated rates in
Serbia deserve careful consideration.
Minimum Wage Regulation
To avoid driving down the demand for formal work, the minimum wage should be
reduced from the current level of 50 % to some 35 %–40 % of the average wage, as
was the case in Serbia until several years ago and as recommended by the World
Bank for middle-developed countries. Moreover, the introduction of a slightly
lower minimum wage for youth under 25 years of age should be considered, to
stimulate their open-ended employment. Similarly, the minimum wage could vary
slightly by region so as to partly reflect regional differences in the cost of living
(which is slightly higher in Belgrade than in the rest of Serbia).
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Working Hours Regulation
The body of regulations governing working hours should be carefully analysed to
see which of the current standards are more costly for employers or do not benefit
workers, and an effort should be made to change them. The suggestions made below
are based on comparative data on prevailing practices in OECD countries and on
employers’ most common complaints.
– Slightly reduce increased hourly rates for overtime and work on weekends and
holidays.
– Allow more flexible re-allocation of working hours, both within the working
week and for longer periods of time, subject to the consent of both employee and
employer.
– Allow annual leave to be used as agreed between employee and employer.
Employment Protection Legislation
The most urgent requirement in this respect is the removal of the statutory provision
obliging employers to pay employees severance in proportion to each employee’s
total years of service rather than only years of service spent with that employer.
This would foster formal employment, primarily of elderly workers with work
experience.
In addition, the maximum length of employment under individual fixed-term
contracts should be extended from 1–2 or 3 years. This change would probably not
have a major impact, as breaches of this rule are rife, with businesses extending
such contracts beyond the statutory maximum by manipulating job titles. Nonethe-
less, this change must be made to give the most compliant businesses (frequently
foreign investors, who are also the ones objecting the most to this provision) more
flexibility in adjusting the volume and structure of their workforce. In addition, a
better general principle is to comply with a good rule than not to comply with a
bad one.
Retirement Rules
An increase in the formal employment of elderly workers, as well as a parallel drop
in their undeclared work, would be achieved by raising the current retirement age
threshold, introducing actuarial adjustment of pensions to reflect the life expectancy
of people who retire earlier, and providing for actuarial rewards for those who
continue to work and pay pension contributions after meeting conditions for full
retirement, regardless of whether they receive pensions or not.
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Welfare Benefits
In Serbian practice, welfare benefits are available almost exclusively to unem-
ployed and inactive persons, which lead those who are able to work to combine
welfare and informal employment. To incentivise employment in the formal sector,
an in-work benefits programme should be introduced along the lines of the US
Earned Income Tax Credit, which would make it possible for workers to combine
formal employment and welfare benefits, with the latter gradually reduced as
earnings increase.
Specific Measures Targeting Informal Employment
Evaluations show that various specific measures targeting informal employment are
more beneficial than a blanket reduction in tax rates, which can have much broader
implications and not sufficiently reflect a reduction in the shadow economy
(Eurofound 2008).
An example of a targeted programme is support for formal self-employment.
This measure is applied in Serbia by the National Employment Service (NES), and
it involves a one-off non-repayable grant and some in-kind support, provided that
the beneficiary regularly pays contributions and taxes for at least the following
2 years. On average, some 3,000–5,000 people per year become self-employed
through this programme; NES staff estimate that most of them merely formalise
their informal businesses. It is interesting to note that evaluations show that
entrepreneurs who have been legalised have higher survival rates than those who
start businesses without previous experience in the informal sector.
Some European countries apply a broader range of support measures to ease the
shift from unemployment or informal employment towards formal self-
employment. A special programme is available in the Netherlands that offers tax
breaks for relatives and other persons who lend start-up money to those without
jobs. Germany subsidises the unemployed who start their own business for 3 years;
the subsidies decrease gradually over the course of the 3-year period (Eurofound
2008). In Serbia unemployed persons can receive the entire amount of unemploy-
ment benefits to which they are entitled in advance, on condition they use the
money for self-employment.
Microlending is also a measure that facilitates the establishment of legal sole
proprietorships, especially for those categories of people who cannot rely on their
own funds or commercial credit. Formal borrowing is believed to increase the
likelihood of a business becoming formal (Eurofound 2008).
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Recommendations for Improving the Efficiency of the Labour
Inspectorate in Tackling Undeclared Work
An analysis of the position, operation, and volume of activities undertaken by the
Labour Inspectorate shows that this body has been achieving relatively good results
in terms of addressing undeclared work, given the constraints on its operation
imposed by regulations, limited human resources, and lack of other capacities.
This finding is further borne out by the fact that 56 % of all respondents in the
Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia awarded good marks (4 and 5 on
a scale from one to five) to the Labour Inspectorate, while a mere 12 % gave it poor
marks (1 and 2 on a scale from one to five). This result is slightly better than that
achieved by the other two institutions in charge of tackling the shadow economy,
the Tax Administration and Market Inspectorate.
As has already been demonstrated using a multitude of examples, one of the key
problems in the operation of the Labour Inspectorate is the lack of co-ordination
and integration with other inspection and oversight services. This problem could be
overcome by integrating the various inspection services into an Inspectorate-
General (of which the Labour Inspectorate would be a part) to achieve synergy
and avoid duplication of activities, while at the same time establishing a consistent
system that would be more efficient at preventing some of the most dangerous
participants in the shadow economy (such as ‘phantom companies’) from operating
with virtual impunity by using loopholes in existing legislation.
Changes to legislation should be considered that would allow labour inspectors
to access and examine all premises where business is conducted, regardless of
whether the entities in question are formally registered or not. In addition, it would
be beneficial to allow labour inspectors to impose fines as part of a simplified
procedure.
A long-standing complaint of the Labour Inspectorate is that they have too few
people and too much work, and that the number of inspectors needs to be increased
substantially if optimal results are to be achieved. Inspectors are well qualified, and
nearly all of them have university degrees. The Inspectorate has limited Informa-
tion and Communication Technology (ICT) capacity. There are electronic linkages
with the Business Registries Agency and an internal analytics and planning data-
base has been developed. However, the Inspectorate cannot establish direct links
with business records, the Tax Administration, the National Employment Service,
or social security organisations.
The key measures for removing administrative barriers are better co-operation
between the Labour Inspectorate and the Tax Administration, social security
organisations, the police, and courts. Moreover, co-operation with the National
Employment Service is tenuous: the database of people receiving unemployment
assistance is not available to the Inspectorate, which is an issue that needs to be
resolved.
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Recommendations for Improving the Efficiency of the Market
Inspectorate in Tackling the Shadow Economy
The broadest recommendation in an institutional sense entails the drafting of a
framework Inspections Law, harmonised with European Union regulations, to
ensure better mutual co-ordination of inspection oversight and better delimitation
of the powers of the various inspection services. This piece of legislation would also
allow the closure of numerous loopholes in the powers of inspection bodies that
have made it possible for the shadow economy to flourish and have hindered the
implementation of activities designed to combat it. A commission to co-ordinate
inspection oversight should be established as quickly as possible. The advantages of
an integrated inspections approach are particularly obvious in the area of authority
of the Market Inspectorate. A unified database of offenders and offences, accessible
to all inspection services, the Tax Administration, the Customs Administration, and
the police, would improve the efficiency of the fight against the shadow economy.
The integration of powers would mean that inspectors that uncover an unregistered
or unreported entity or person engaging in an activity under the remit of another
inspection agency would be both authorised and required to demand that any
deficiencies be remedied and to notify the Tax Administration of the infringement
and the measures taken.
Specific recommendations for improving the efficiency of the Market Inspec-
torate have been made as part of the Regulatory Reform Project and USAID BEP.
In addition to the above, these include the need to re-organise it along territorial
lines and reduce the number of regional units, as well as to strengthen its functional
organisation to ensure more complete oversight of the trade in specific goods
throughout the country. Furthermore, inspectors should act solely pursuant to
audit orders: this would avoid arbitrariness and guarantee adherence to the hierar-
chy and transparency of inspection oversight. A risk assessment system should be
introduced (to focus on the likelihood of non-compliance or infraction), as should a
risk management system for inspection oversight. Among the changes needed are
more training for inspectors, new software development, and better public infor-
mation about the work of the Inspectorate. Periodic outreach campaigns should be
organised aimed at both offenders and the general public; we will go into this issue
in greater detail at the end of this chapter.
9.2.4 Measures Relating to the Financial Sector
Curb Transactions in Cash and Incentivise Cashless Payments
Cash transactions involve money changing hands without the use of bank accounts,
and are also termed ‘cash-in-hand’ payments. These transactions are not formally
registered. In addition, in highly dollarised economies such payments are predom-
inantly made and received in foreign currency.
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Cashless and, particularly, electronic payments are among the means that can be
used to reduce the volume of cash transactions, both formal and informal. Elec-
tronic payments therefore make it more difficult for parties to operate in the
informal sector (Schneider 2011).
In the case of Serbia, an anti-crisis measure exempting certain entities from the
requirement to use fiscal cash registers does not seem to have resulted in better
reporting of cash transactions, nor in a decrease in the shadow economy. On the
contrary, it has facilitated informal cash transactions.
In addition to reducing the volume of cash transactions, greater use of cashless
payments would increase reporting, particularly by businesses and small entrepre-
neurs, and thereby make it impossible to conceal any portion of revenue generated
in cash. Several measures can be implemented to boost the share of cashless
(primarily electronic) payments in Serbia.
Incentives need to be preferred over repressive measures against the use of cash
in financial transactions. Given the rapid pace of technological development, it is
relatively easy to allow payments using electronic money so that sellers of goods
and services are compelled to offer electronic payments in sectors presently dom-
inated by cash payments (catering, taxi cabs, etc.). There are also many incentives
that can be used, such as subsidising point-of-sale terminals for small and micro-
businesses, limited tax incentives for electronic payments (as introduced by Argen-
tina, Colombia, and South Korea), and prepaid cards for people without bank
accounts to enable their inclusion in the formal sector. On the macroeconomic
level, government subsidies and assistance could be paid out electronically, as
could various types of contributions (as is the case in Russia). Further, all govern-
ment payments could be limited to electronic channels only.
Cash payments can be constrained directly. For instance, an Italian law dubbed
the Decreto Bersani (D. Lgs. 7/2007) imposes a €100 limit on cash payments for
professional services on pain of a strict prison sentence.3 Bulgaria is an interesting
example when it comes to applying restrictive measures. In 2011, Bulgaria intro-
duced a law restricting cash payments, which sets out conditions for limiting
payments in cash in its territory, which should reduce the extent of the shadow
economy (Bulgarian Ministry of Finance 2011). Besides the implementation of
measures aimed at limiting cash payments, more effort should be put into educating
users of payment cards about their uses and benefits.
Moreover, economic policymakers should reach a clear consensus on the appli-
cation of a de-euroisation strategy. This would contribute to a substantial reduction
in cash payments—particularly informal ones—throughout the system. The
3 In addition to simplifying start-up procedures (Art. 9), the Decreto Bersani, adopted in 2007
(D. Lgs. 7/2007) introduced strict penalties for activities in the shadow economy. As such, it is a
good example of measures designed to tackle informal activity. The penalty for a construction
company employing undeclared workers is the closure of its construction site. A retail outlet
caught not issuing fiscal receipts three times in 5 years can be closed down permanently. Finally,
theDecreto Bersani prohibits cash payments of more than €100 for professional services rendered.
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environment would then favourably affect macroeconomic stability, further driving
down the shadow economy.
Finally, to ensure that the remaining cash transactions take place primarily
within formal channels, field audits should be strengthened to ensure fiscal cash
registers are used and receipts are issued for all transactions.
Formalise Remittances from Abroad Transferred Through
Informal Channels
In the opinion of businesspeople, greater transfer of funds using formal channels
(primarily the banking sector, money transfer agencies, and the post office) could be
achieved by reducing transfer costs (commissions and fees). Greater formality
would also increase transparency and facilitate the use of these funds to finance
activities that contribute to the growth and development of the recipient country
(Jongwanich 2007; Ratha and Mohapatra 2007; Ratha 2009; Ratha and Silwal
2012).4 Serbia has high transfer costs compared with the global average, which
has been estimated at about 9 % of funds remitted (World Bank 2012). What is
more, in Serbia commission charges on incoming money transfers are higher for
smaller amounts (in percentages), which disincentivises emigrants from sending
money through formal channels.5
Greater competition of entities that transfer funds formally and lower transfer
costs would increase migrant interest in sending remittances through formal chan-
nels and offer numerous benefits to recipients, who are mainly people with lower
incomes. These benefits include easier access to financial institutions, cheaper
finance available to a larger share of the population, lower investment risk due to
easier diversification, and better education of recipients of remittances about
alternative ways of using those funds.
Formal transfer channels should be easier to access, more reliable, faster, and
cheaper than competing informal channels. The choice of more expensive formal
and informal channels is often driven by the loss of anonymity inherent in bank
transfers. Regulators of countries where funds are sent and received should enter
into appropriate bilateral agreements to formalise and facilitate the transfer,
channelling, and registration of funds received (see, for instance, the experience
of Mexico in Herna´ndez-Cos 2005). This process can take the form of a public-
private partnership with the participation of financial institutions. Establishing
closer co-operation between the banking sectors of countries where remittances
4 The costs of transferring funds into Serbia using specialised money transfer agencies are, on
average, 10–15 % (commission plus exchange rate difference), while the individual sums trans-
ferred average between €100 and €300 each.
5 Several commercial banks in Serbia have, of their own accord, successfully cut remittance
transfer costs severalfold to an average of 0.2–0.4 % of the sum remitted. This is an improvement,
but still does not bring Serbia up to par with countries that apply fixed commission charges
regardless of the amount remitted.
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originate and receiving countries should reduce transaction costs and accelerate
transfers using this formal channel.
To ensure adequate competition between institutions that participate in the
transfer process, regulations governing the various players in the market need to
be harmonised, giving due consideration to the protection of the services’ clients.
The role of the regulatory bodies would include oversight of transfers to reduce the
risk of any form of abuse and mismanagement of funds and to increase client
confidence in this transfer mechanism. A greater role for banks in the transfer of
remittances should reduce transaction costs and increase the speed and reliability of
the service. This could be achieved by developing a single clearing system to be
shared by the participating countries.6 Easier access by a greater share of the
population to financial services provided by banks and other financial institutions
should boost domestic savings and the use of remittances for investment.
Greater investment of remittance funds needs to be stimulated by a good
investment climate in the migrants’ country of origin and investment incentives
(e.g., tax breaks). The Law on Foreign Exchange Operations (Official Gazette of the
Republic of Serbia, No. 62/2006, Art. 29) and its amendments (Official Gazette of
the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 31/2011 and 119/2012) make it possible to repatriate
non-resident profits generated in the local economy after taxes are paid, unless
otherwise specified.
Formalising the channels used for remittance inflows would also enhance the
efficiency of the financial sector through economies of scale resulting from greater
inflow of funds and more services provided (Gupta et al. 2009; Aggarwal
et al. 2011). This would also allow for these institutions to become more involved
in encouraging entrepreneurship and other investment by using the funds received
to attract deposits and offer loans, advisory services, insurance, and custody
operations. The largest banks would stand to benefit most from these transactions,
as they could offer the greatest volume of services and reduce transaction costs the
most. By providing affordable remittance transfer services, they could induce both
migrants and their family members in the country of origin to purchase other profit-
making services offered by the bank.
The stability of remittance inflows has led some developing countries (e.g.,
Turkey and countries in Latin America) to use them as collateral in new bank
borrowing and on-lending cycles.
As the greatest share of remittances sent through formal channels are electronic
transfers, appropriate infrastructure to access these funds needs to be put into place
throughout the receiving country. The development of technical and IT infrastruc-
ture at the local level could be funded through public-private partnership, and the
project approved by the development bank of the country in question or another
regulatory body. A well-developed infrastructure to support money transfers from
6According to data made available by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Diaspora, the
number of Serbian expatriates is estimated at about four million. Most remittances are sent from
Western Europe, particularly Austria and Germany, as well as from Serbia’s neighbours.
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abroad would also facilitate access to other financial services (such as current
accounts, savings accounts, and credit instruments) for a broader section of the
population.
Further development of formal remittance transfer channels would, in time, lead
to the development of innovative products to help migrants invest directly in their
country of origin by, for instance, purchasing land or real estate.
Moreover, special programmes could be set up to combine remittances sent by
groups of migrants with funds provided by the central government or local author-
ities to jointly finance infrastructure projects of local or public importance (such as
schools, hospitals, roads, sports centres, churches, parks, irrigation, electricity
supply, computers, medical supplies, etc.).
The sending and registration of remittances should be regulated gradually, so
that these flows can be better studied and this segment of the market developed
without excessive and hasty government intervention, which could retard or
disincentivise additional remittance inflows.
These and other possible enhancements of the regulatory environment and the
financial system would contribute to greater inflows of remittances into Serbia
through formal channels and their more efficient channelling into investment,
which can be expected to have a positive impact on the economic growth and
development of the country.
9.2.5 Measures Related to the Business Environment
These measures that have an impact on the conditions for doing business will be
examined from the point of view of whether they are aimed at business entities that
already operate in the formal sector but carry out some or the majority of their
activities in the shadow economy, or are directed at entities completely in the
informal sector.
Measures Aimed at Business Entities Operating Partially
in the Shadow Economy
Resolve the Issue and Consequences of ‘Phoenix Companies’
‘Phoenix companies’, entities that transfer assets to a newly formed business while
leaving debts vested in an old one, make a substantial contribution to the chain of
illiquidity, primarily with regard to small and medium-sized businesses, which in
these circumstances are forced to move part of their activities into the shadow
economy. There are several options for resolving this issue. The first one involves
the ex-post introduction of a special Registry of Bans, similar to the already extant
Court Ban Registry, which would serve as a record of all bans imposed on managers
and owners of businesses facing criminal or other proceedings (e.g., under
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Art. 46 of the Misdemeanours Law, which provides for bans on the performance of
a particular activity). Numerous countries have similar registration regimes in place
(such as Estonia, Norway, the UK, Ireland, and Macedonia). Regardless of this, the
Business Offences Law, Misdemeanours Law, and Criminal Code must begin to be
consistently implemented, as they govern fraudulently causing insolvency and
other business crimes that damage creditors and jeopardise the exercise of their
rights. Another approach would ex-ante prohibit individuals from managing a
business and establishing new entities when their existing business has been
operating with a frozen bank account for in excess of a certain number of days,
has not been filing financial reports, or has not been paying taxes. However,
applying the second option might create the wrong incentives and penalise those
who are not actually responsible so that introducing manager disqualification would
prove counter-productive. In addition, regardless of which solution is adopted to
ban operating in any capacity, both approaches will have shortcomings if regula-
tions are not implemented consistently, as it will not be possible to prevent the
establishment of new entities by other parties or foreign off-shore centres. Another
option open to dishonest businesspeople is to establish several firms in advance as a
precaution, and then use them one by one.
Impose Barriers to the Introduction of New Administrative Burdens
by Requiring the Application of the SME Test and the Standard Cost Model7
The Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME) Test is designed to assess the
impact of new regulation on small and medium-sized businesses in order to avoid
imposing disproportionately large burdens on them. Although Article 40(2) of the
Rules of Procedure of the Serbian Government stipulates that a regulatory impact
assessment should contain information on the costs that a new piece of legislation
will impose on SMEs, this is not sufficiently comprehensive, and should be
replaced by a provision requiring the inclusion of the SME Test as an integral
part of the assessment. The SME Test should, above all, examine the proposed
legislation from the point of view of its suitability for the SME sector to see whether
SMEs should be partly or fully exempt from the new regulatory requirements, as
well as estimate or quantify the annual costs faced by micro, small, and medium-
sized enterprises. The Regulatory Reform Office has already developed the SME
Test but it is yet to be implemented. The second approach involves the Standard
Cost Model (SCM), which measures the overall administrative cost and the burden
of new administrative requirements and has been developed by the Regulatory
Reform Office in the form of a turnkey software application. The use of this tool is
7 Since 2008 the European Union has been implementing the Small Business Act as a new
framework for SME development policy. As the act is part of the acquis communautaire, its
significance for EU candidate countries is also substantial. The SME Test is an integral part
of the EU’s regulatory impact assessment procedure.
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yet to be mandated for amending administrative requirements or introducing new
ones. The consistent and mandatory use of the SCM could prevent undue admin-
istrative burdens. Both methods have become integrated into the European Com-
mission’s regulatory impact assessments and are used in many EU member states.
Simplify Regulatory (Administrative) Requirements
The aim of the Comprehensive Regulation Reform effort and NALED’s8 (2012)
Grey Book V is to identify, with the active participation of businesses themselves,
administrative burdens and procedures that unduly constrain doing business and to
find the simplest solutions for removing them. Practice has shown that the problems
identified are resolved too slowly, which creates additional costs for business
entities. Some issues, such as the removal of ‘turnover and incoming payment
ledgers’ and the abolishing of complicated pregnancy and maternity leave pro-
cedures, have been in the pipeline for several years. Instead of acting on an ad hoc
basis, the government needs to adopt a clear plan for removing unnecessary
administrative requirements and report to the public on its realisation.
Regulate the Public Consultation Process
In contrast to European Union practice, stakeholder participation in the legislative
process in Serbia is often unsatisfactory. In the EU a minimum of 8 weeks is set
aside for public consultation. According to Transparency Serbia, statutory pro-
visions governing public comment periods in Serbia are inadequate. Among other
things, there is no pre-defined form of public debate and no sanctions if a public
body fails to launch such a debate. Non-compliance with the law by public
authorities is compounded by the frequently passive stance of business entities.
There are multiple reasons for this behaviour. Businesses often lack the necessary
time and resources or simply do not feel that they can change anything. Serbian
laws stipulate that a public comment period is mandatory where a proposed piece of
legislation significantly changes the statutory treatment of a particular area, or
where the issues at hand are of particular interest to the public. Except for this
requirement imposed on the legislator, public consultation is not governed in
greater detail. In some cases there is no public comment period but it essentially
takes place by other means (e.g., in roundtables, public gatherings, etc.). To
improve the current situation the minimum requirement could be the posting of a
proposed piece of legislation on the web site of a ministry or other regulator at least
8 weeks before that piece of legislation enters formal procedure. In addition,
depending on the issues to be governed by the proposed regulations, as part of the
8National Alliance for Local Economic Development.
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law drafting process consultation with local authorities and legitimate representa-
tives of business and other professional associations must be improved.
Adopt Bylaws in a Timely Fashion
One of the fundamental causes of legal insecurity is lateness in the adoption of
bylaws, which makes it impossible to implement laws. When bylaws are not
adopted in due time, new laws cannot be implemented, while old legislation
lapses.9 Faced with this legal vacuum, business entities are often forced to make
do without knowing whether they are operating in accordance with the law or if
their activities fall within the scope of the shadow economy. The legal insecurity
created by this situation has major consequences for the economy. There are several
options that can be considered. One (admittedly extreme) option is not to allow a
draft document (or bill) to begin the procedure of becoming law without all bylaws
being ready. Another option is to make the existence of guidelines for drafting
specific bylaws the minimum condition for beginning the procedure. A third option
would be to make it impossible to implement a law without providing a detailed
explanatory note stating how it will affect the private sector, including calculations
of costs and a detailed consideration of the specific requirements to be governed by
bylaws. Finally, realistic deadlines should be set for the adoption of bylaws.
Improved Protection from Unfair Competition
The Law on Trade prohibits unfair competition; that is, actions of a business aimed
against another business that damage or may damage a competitor through untrue
or insulting claims regarding that business, or through the sale of goods whose
labels, packaging, or shape create justifiable confusion regarding the quality or
other characteristics of such goods. However, there are substantial problems with
the application of the law. The Ministry of Trade has introduced a Bill Amending
and Supplementing the Law on Trade, currently undergoing parliamentary proce-
dure, which includes a new article whereby businesses will be able to seek intan-
gible damages for harm to their reputation arising from unfair competition.
However, while this change will improve current legal framework, the implemen-
tation has to be substantially improved.
9According to an analysis carried out by NALED in 2012 (NALED 2012), only three bylaws were
adopted before the deadline, 33 were adopted after the deadline, while in 163 cases the deadline
expired before the bylaws were adopted.
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Measures Directed at Business Entities Operating Wholly
in the Informal Economy
Establish an E-Portal for Licences, Permits, Approvals, and Consents
Although reform of the registration process has made it much easier to incorporate a
business entity, in some sectors of activity there remain a large number of admin-
istrative requirements that an entity must meet. When filing for permits and
approvals, business entities often face administrative requirements that leave
them unsure what to submit, which steps to take, or which body to contact. A
solution already implemented in the region is an e-portal for licences, permits,
approvals, and consents that would contain detailed information, directions, docu-
ments, and contacts to make it easier to start a business. Immediately after being
incorporated, although formally registered, businesses often cannot legally engage
in an activity while they wait for an approval or licence. To bridge this gap
businesses begin doing part of their business in the informal sector, and continue
doing so even when the licences are finally received. This e-portal could be made
part of the e-Government web site and contain instructions for each individual
sector. Another option would be to host it on the Business Registries Agency
web site.
Remove Barriers to Entry in Particular Sectors
Over the past several years new requirements have appeared that business entities
have to meet before they can begin operating in a particular sector of activity. While
in some sectors these are justified, in others they are typical barriers to entry, set up
to protect current participants in the market. Recent examples are the introduction
of a solicitors’ examination and the review of regulations governing the profession
of tourist guide. If a portal for licences, permits, approvals, and consents is
established, existing requirements could be analysed, some procedures could be
simplified, and, finally, some requirements could be abolished. In addition, efficient
implementation of the Competition Law plays a major role in removing barriers to
entry and it must be substantially improved.
Establish an Authoritative Registry of Legislation Accessible to the Public
Free of Charge
Among the constraints faced by new start-ups are the costs they must meet to obtain
information that is, by its very nature, in the public domain. Small businesses
usually rely on their bookkeepers or lawyers, but they should also be allowed to
access a legislation database. Sluzˇbeni Glasnik (‘Official Gazette’), the public body
tasked with publishing authoritative texts of legislation in the journal of the same
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name, has of its own initiative developed a database of legislation containing
revised texts of current regulations and PDF files of the relevant issues of the
Official Gazette where the regulations and their amendments are published. This
database can be considered authoritative in the sense that all of its users are able to
rely on the authenticity of the contents of the PDF files. Public access to this
database would significantly reduce transaction costs at the level of the entire
economy, and in particular would make it easier for new start-ups to operate and
to reduce their expenses.
Construction Permits and ‘Legalisation’
The construction permit procedure is inefficient and lengthy due to a very compli-
cated system that involves filing for permits with a large number of entities. Unable
to obtain permits, some business entities start construction illicitly, at great risk.
Developers (or investors) hire workers from the informal sector and engage busi-
nesses and entrepreneurs that do not declare such work. Accelerating construction
permit procedures, decentralising authority, establishing ‘one-stop shops’ at local
authorities, changing the role of public entities in the permit procedure,
harmonising procedures, drafting plans, etc. would all greatly contribute to shifting
construction activities into the formal sector.10
Another serious issue is the ‘legalisation’ of buildings, i.e., the subsequent
issuance of construction permits for unpermitted properties. According to available
data, nearly 700,000 buildings constructed without permits have been reported to
local authorities; sources indicate that there are 1.3 million unregistered buildings.
This legalisation procedure must be simplified to incorporate clearly defined and
restricted deadlines, while the fees for subsequent issuance of permits must be
based on economic criteria.
9.2.6 Outreach Campaigns
Outreach campaigns should play a particularly important role in the implementa-
tion of the proposed measures, which should have an impact on reducing tax
evasion and encourage entities to move from the informal to the formal sector.
Outreach campaigns should clearly point out the risks and expenses associated with
operating in the shadow economy and the benefits of formalisation, or aim to
change their audiences’ views of the morality of tax evasion.11
10 Detailed proposals for resolving construction permit issues are presented in the Assessment of
Constraints to Construction Permits in Serbia, prepared for the USAID Business Enabling Project
(2012).
11 The most important outreach campaigns in the region have been ‘Take the Receipt’ in Serbia in
late 2004, and ‘VAT is Your Money’, which is still in progress in Montenegro.
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These campaigns should be aimed at both participants in the transaction: where
they focus on tax evasion their target should be both buyers and sellers and if the
topic is employment they should target both employers and workers. The cam-
paigns should be general but should focus on sectors where the shadow economy is
most widespread (such as construction or transportation), or on particular social or
demographic segments of the population (particularly on those groups, such as
young people, who believe activities in the shadow economy are an acceptable form
of behaviour).
The International Labour Organisation and the European Union recommend the
use of information campaigns to combat the shadow economy. Education cam-
paigns targeting taxpayers, the media, and the general public should be intensified
to maximise impact.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Aggarwal R, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt A, Martinez Peria MS (2011) Do workers’ remittances promote
financial development? J Dev Econ 96(2):255–264
Arsic´ M, Randjelovic´ S (2012) Periodicˇno oporezivanje imovine u Srbiji: Sˇta smo uradili i sˇta smo
naucˇili. GIZ – studija u izradi
Arsic´ M, Altiparmakov N, Ranđelovic´ S, Buc´ic´ A, Vasiljevic´ D, Levitas T (2010) Tax policy in
Serbia – looking forward. Foundation for the Advancement of Economics, Belgrade
Bulgarian Ministry of Finance (2011) The shadow economy: how to measure and model it. Brief
methodological analyses. www.minfin.bg/document/9795:4
Eurofound (2008) Tackling undeclared work in the European Union. Eurofound, Dublin.
Gupta S, Pattilo CA, Wagh S (2009) Effect of remittances on poverty and financial development in
sub-Saharan Africa. World Dev 37(1):104–115
Herna´ndez-Cos R (2005) The U.S.–Mexico remittance corridor – lessons on shifting from
informal to formal transfer systems. World Bank Working Paper No. 47. The World Bank,
Washington, DC
Jongwanich J (2007) Workers’ remittances, economic growth and poverty in developing Asia and
Pacific countries. UNESCCAP Working Paper, WP/07/01
Krstic´ G et al (1998) Analysis of the grey economy in the FRY with estimates of its volume for
1997 and recommendations for its legalisation. Economics Institute Belgrade
NALED (2012) Siva knjiga 5 - Preporuke za uklanjanje administrativnih prepreka za poslovanje u
Srbiji 2012/2013
Ratha D (2009) Remittances in development: a lifeline to poor countries. Finance and Dev 46(4)
Ratha D, Mohapatra S (2007) Increasing the macroeconomic impact of remittances on develop-
ment. In: Development Prospects Group. The World Bank, Washington, DC
Ratha D, Silwal A (2012) The World Bank – migration and development brief, 18
Schneider F (2011) The shadow economy in Europe – using payment systems to combat the
shadow economy. http://www.bblf.bg/uploads/files/file_378.pdf
Schneider F, Enste D (2000) Shadow economies: size, causes and consequences. J Econ Lit 38
(1):77–114
9 Main Findings and Recommendations 157
USAID Business Enabling Project (2012) Assessment of constraints to construction permits in
Serbia
Williams CC (2005) Small business in the informal economy: making the transition to the formal
economy – the evidence base. Small Business Service, London
Williams C, Horlings E, Renooy P (2008) Tackling undeclared work in the EU, European
Foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions, 2008
World Bank (2012). Migration and development brief 19, November 2012
158 G. Krstic´ et al.
